[#6363] Re: rescue clause affecting IO loop behavior — ts <decoux@...>

>>>>> "D" == David Alan Black <dblack@candle.superlink.net> writes:

17 messages 2000/11/14
[#6367] Re: rescue clause affecting IO loop behavior — David Alan Black <dblack@...> 2000/11/14

Hello again --

[#6582] best way to interleaf arrays? — David Alan Black <dblack@...>

Hello --

15 messages 2000/11/26

[#6646] RE: Array Intersect (&) question — Aleksi Niemel<aleksi.niemela@...>

Ross asked something about widely known and largely ignored language (on

23 messages 2000/11/29
[#6652] RE: Array Intersect (&) question — rpmohn@... (Ross Mohn) 2000/11/29

aleksi.niemela@cinnober.com (Aleksi Niemel) wrote in

[#6723] Re: Array Intersect (&) question — Mathieu Bouchard <matju@...> 2000/12/01

> >Use a hash. Here's code to do both and more. It assumes that

[#6656] printing/accessing arrays and hashes — raja@... (Raja S.)

I'm coming to Ruby with a Python & Common Lisp background.

24 messages 2000/11/30

[ruby-talk:6319] Re: Q: Sandbox security, SAFE and system

From: Robert Feldt <feldt@...>
Date: 2000-11-13 17:38:20 UTC
List: ruby-talk #6319
On Tue, 14 Nov 2000, Dave Thomas wrote:

> Robert Feldt <feldt@ce.chalmers.se> writes:
> 
> > I'm trying to understand SAFe and tainting in Ruby but I can't see how it
> > can help me create a "sandbox" for constrained execution of scripts and
> > apps not in my direct control. I would like to limit the files a script
> > (and any processes it might spawn/fork etc.) can access and write to a
> > specified sub-directory, but I guess it's out of reach for Ruby's tainting
> > and SAFE model?
> 
> If you're on a Unix box, could you use Dir.chroot?
>
Probably, but I need something that is at least portable to Windows
2000 (win2k+cygwin ok?!). Preferably to other Ruby exec 
environments. Wouldn't it be nice to have a sandbox extension so that you
could have this kind of func available regardless of platform and level of
priviliges?

What about wrapping something along the lines:
	* redefine file/dir related Ruby funcs and make sure they operate
	  within a subdir
	* freeze File and Dir so that they cannot be tampered with
	* disallow syscall's that could start apps
in an extension with an interface a la:

Sandbox.new do 
  # Run potentially dangerous code...
end

Is it possible or will there be obvious security holes?

Thanks,

Robert


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