[#101179] Spectre Mitigations — Amel <amel.smajic@...>
Hi there!
5 messages
2020/12/01
[#101180] Re: Spectre Mitigations
— Chris Seaton <chris@...>
2020/12/01
I wouldn’t recommend using Ruby to run in-process untrusted code in the first place. Are people doing that?
[#101694] Ruby 3.0.0 Released — "NARUSE, Yui" <naruse@...>
We are pleased to announce the release of Ruby 3.0.0. From 2015 we
4 messages
2020/12/25
[ruby-core:101181] Re: Spectre Mitigations
From:
Amel <amel.smajic@...>
Date:
2020-12-01 16:05:09 UTC
List:
ruby-core #101181
Trusted code can potentially be vulnerable to Spectre attacks, as branch prediction on modern processors occurs in all code where there are branches. The question is how can I stop security critical branches from being executed out-of-order and thus protect my trusted code? Amel On 01.12.20 16:44, Chris Seaton wrote: > I wouldn’t recommend using Ruby to run in-process untrusted code in the first place. Are people doing that? > > Chris > >> On 1 Dec 2020, at 15:32, Amel <amel.smajic@student.tugraz.at> wrote: >> >> Hi there! >> >> I've already asked this question in the ruby-talk mailing list and it was hinted at that ruby-core could be the better place to ask, so here's my question. >> >> Are there any mitigations in Ruby for the Spectre security vulnerability? Maybe in the interpreter itself or a function which is similar to the lfence-instruction. >> If there isn't, are there any mitigations planned? >> >> Cheers, >> >> Amel >> >> >> Unsubscribe: <mailto:ruby-core-request@ruby-lang.org?subject=unsubscribe> >> <http://lists.ruby-lang.org/cgi-bin/mailman/options/ruby-core> > > Unsubscribe: <mailto:ruby-core-request@ruby-lang.org?subject=unsubscribe> > <http://lists.ruby-lang.org/cgi-bin/mailman/options/ruby-core> Unsubscribe: <mailto:ruby-core-request@ruby-lang.org?subject=unsubscribe> <http://lists.ruby-lang.org/cgi-bin/mailman/options/ruby-core>