From: Eivind Eklund <eeklund@...>
Date: 2008-05-08T18:41:58+09:00
Subject: Re: In order to cross platform, Ruby is designed to be interpreted in runtime, so Ruby code is exposed on the server. This brings a security danger which is not acceptable.

On Wed, May 7, 2008 at 9:11 AM, Phillip Gawlowski
<cmdjackryan@googlemail.com> wrote:
>  There's security, and then there's security theater.
>
>  Ah production server should only run what's needed, anyway. That is the
>  main reason not to have dev tools running on them (though, have fun
>  trying to remove all text editors on a *NIX machine, and the Shell which
>  probably is Turing complete): Reducing the exposed surface area.

I agree with reducing exposed attack surface.  I have a different way
of thinking about what constitute attack surface, though: I think in
terms of available security capabilities.

In terms of this, a compiler is equivalent to a file write to a file
where you can set the x (execute) bit, plus a few megabytes of
diskspace.  Unless you restrict these, compiler access is a VERY minor
hurdle.

So - consider it against convenience.  I'd rather have my production
machines easy to deal with for me (which makes it more likely that I
maintain them in a way that block attacks) than adding such a minor
hurdle for attackers.  I'll add other, major hurdles instead, like
putting a non-breakable chroot around processes that are
network-accessible and could likely contain flaws.

Eivind.